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Ralf Rogowski* 
Industrial Relations as a Social System** 
The article starts with a criticism of John Dunlop’s systems theory of industrial 
relations. The article argues that some of the weaknesses of Dunlop’s approach can 
be overcome by a systems theoretical conceptualisation of industrial relations based 
on Niklas Luhmann's theory of autopoietic social systems. It discusses five types of 
social systems that Luhmann’s theory offers to characterise industrial relations as a 
social system: a set of interaction systems, an organisation system, a conflict system, 
an immune system and a function system of society. The article proposes to adopt a 
view of industrial relations as a fully-fledged function system operating within the 
world society. In its last part it sets out the major characteristics of such an 
autopoietic industrial relations system. 
 
Industrielle Beziehungen als Soziales System 
Ausgehend von einer Kritik an John Dunlops Systemtheorie industrieller 
Beziehungen, wird in dem Beitrag vorgeschlagen, Schwächen des Dunlopschen 
Ansatzes mit Hilfe einer Systemtheorie industrieller Beziehungen auf der Grundlage 
der Theorie autopoietischer Sozialsysteme von Niklas Luhmann zu überwinden. Der 
Artikel diskutiert fünf Typen von Sozialsystemen, die Luhmanns Theorie anbietet, um 
industrielle Beziehungen als Sozialsystem zu definieren: als Verbund lose gekoppelter 
Interaktionssysteme, als ein Organisationssystem, als ein Konfliktsystem, als ein 
Immunsystem und als ein gesellschaftliches Funktionssystem. Plädiert wird 
schließlich für eine Interpretation des Systems industrieller Beziehungen als voll 
entwickeltes Funktionssystem, das in der Weltgesellschaft operiert. Im 
abschliessenden Teil werden wesentliche Charakteristika eines solchen 
autopoietischen Systems industrieller Beziehungen vorgestellt.  
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Systems theory can claim to have been one of the most influential approaches in 
both national and comparative accounts of industrial relations since the 1950s (Bean 
1994: 2-3). In particular John Dunlop's Industrial Relations Systems, first published 
in 19581, has had a lasting impact on national and international industrial relations 
research (Meltz 1991; see also Schienstock 1982: 32-59; Hyman 1989, ch. 5). His 
approach was based on the then fashionable sociological theory of social systems of 
Talcott Parsons. However, since the 1950s general systems theory and social systems 
theory have developed and matured and encountered recently a major paradigm shift 
in which the structural-functionalist view is being replaced by an autopoietic 
understanding of social systems. In the following I shall use Dunlop’s systems theory 
approach as the background against which an alternative approach to the systems 
theoretical conceptualisation of industrial relations, based on Niklas Luhmann's work 
on autopoietic social systems, will be developed. I propose to adopt a new view of 
industrial relations as a fully-fledged autopoietic function system operating within the 
world society. 
1.   A Critique of Dunlop's Systems Theory of Industrial Relations 
Dunlop justifies his usage of systems theory with several direct references to 
Parsons’ theory of social systems. He considers systems theory in general, and 
Parsons' analysis of the economic system as social system in particular, to be 
„suggestive for organising insights and observations about the industrial-relations 
aspects of behaviour in industrial society“ (Dunlop 1958: 5). For Dunlop systems 
theory advances beyond previous approaches in industrial relations research, which 
he disqualifies as „classifications in the spectrum of labour peace and warfare“. He 
expects from an application of Parsons’ systems theory that it can „provide analytical 
meaning to the idea of an industrial relations system“ (Dunlop 1958: 3 (Dunlop’s 
emphasis)). 
Parsons' theory of society includes both an analysis of the structure of society 
and a theory of social evolution. The theory of evolution is based on a concept of 
societal modernisation, which is characterised as a process of functional 
differentiation of the social system into that are specialised to fulfil functions for the 
system at large. Primitive societies are characterised according to Parsons by a low 
degree of differentiation into social subsystems whereas modern societies are 
characterised by structural differentiation of the economic, the political, and finally 
the cultural system, respectively achieved by the Industrial Revolution, the 
Democratic Revolution, and the Educational Revolution (Parsons 1966 on the theory 
of the three revolutions separating early from late modernisation). 
                                                          
1  The 1958 edition of Industrial Relations Systems was reprinted several times and then republished 
in 1993 by the Harvard Business School. The 1993 edition contains a new Preface and a 
Commentary on Industrial Relations as an academic discipline, comparing it with Labour 
Economics and Human Resource Management. However, there are hardly any alterations to the 
main text. 
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Dunlop's starting point is to call the industrial relations system „an analytical 
subsystem of an industrial society on the same logical plane as an economic system“ 
(Dunlop 1958: 5). This, however, deviates from a Parsonian view in which the 
economic system is one „functional“ subsystem of the overarching social system 
when it is decomposed according to the four functional imperatives (see below). For 
Parsons, the industrial relations system can only be a subsystem of a subsystem, most 
likely a subsystem of the economy. Thus, the industrial relations system cannot be on 
the „same logical plane“ as the economic system. 
In line with Parsons' theory of social evolution Dunlop's theory of industrial 
relations focuses on differentiation and modernisation processes both in society and 
in industrial relations. Dunlop calls industrial societies „modern“ when relations of 
managers and workers are formally arranged outside the family, when these relations 
are distinct from political institutions, and when the industrial relations system has an 
existence separate from the economic system. 
Dunlop is inspired by Parsons’ theory after its complete systems-theoretical 
turn, as outlined in Parsons' and Smelser's „Economy and Society“ of 19562. Social 
action is conceived after this turn as the result of a combination of structural forces of 
the social system3. These forces derive from four „pattern variables“ which describe 
functional imperatives: adaptation, goal-attainment, integration and latent-pattern 
maintenance. 
These pattern variables, known as the AGIL scheme, represent not only the 
conditions for social action but also describe both the functions of the main social 
subsystems and the functions of the surrounding systems. Thus, the four main social 
subsystems of society are each characterised by one of the four functions: the 
economy by adaptation, the polity by goal-attainment, law and other mechanisms of 
                                                          
2 Parsons' theory developed in three phases: from the study of the structure of social action as 
voluntaristic, non-deterministic action (Parsons 1937) to an analysis of the structure of social 
interaction as the basis of society as a social system (Parsons 1951) and then into a theory of 
so-called pattern variables and generalised media of communication that create the structures 
of the social system (Parsons 1955, Parsons and Smelser 1956, and most of the „late work“ of 
Parsons). Initially, Parsons' analysis of the structure of society was characterised by a tension 
between action theory and systems theory, a tension which was resolved in favour of systems 
theory after the publication of „The Social System“ (1951), and in particular after „Economy 
and Society“ (1956 with N. Smelser). The emphasis shifted from developing a systems theory 
based on conditions of social interaction to constructing social systems according to 
functional imperatives derived from a general scheme of pattern variables. 
3 An insightful and informative discussion of Parsons’ „systems-theoretical turn“ can be found 
in Habermas’ Lifeworld and System, Vol. 2 of The Theory of Communicative Action (1987). 
Habermas criticises Parsons for his deficit in „action theory“, which Habermas alleges to 
result in neglecting the analysis of the lifeworld context of social systems. However, 
Habermas' criticism is ultimately driven by the normative concern to „defend the subject“ in 
the analysis of society. Thus, despite his integrative theory building, it is in fact Habermas 
who limits the theorising of society and excludes theories that are not centered on subjects 
and their „communicative actions“. 
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social control by integration and „the locus of cultural and motivational 
commitments“, e.g., family and cultural institutions, by latent-pattern maintenance 
(Parsons and Smelser 1956: 46-53). Furthermore, the surrounding systems are also 
characterised by these functions. Whereas the social system is characterised by 
integration, the cultural system is characterised by latency, the personality system by 
goal-attainment, and the behavioural organism by adaptation.  
In a „note“ added to his outline of basic features of an industrial relations 
system,4 Dunlop offers the following application of Parsons' differentiation concept 
and his four functional imperatives to the study of industrial relations. A quotation 
from this note demonstrates Dunlop's use of systems theory. In addition it introduces 
the main components of Dunlop's own conception of an industrial relations system: 
„The functional differentiation of an industrial relations system and the corresponding 
specialised structures or processes may be defined as follows: (1) Adaptive – The regulatory 
processes or rule making in which the specialised output is a complex of rules relating the actors to 
the technological and market environment and the frequent changes which pose problems of 
adaptation to the actors. (2) Goal Gratification – The polity or political functions in the subsystem 
are specialised toward the contribution of survival or stability of the industrial relations system and 
to survival and stability of the hierarchies of the separate actors which is requisite for the attainment 
of goals by the actors. (3) Integration – The function of maintaining solidarity among the actors in 
the system is contributed by the shared understandings and common ideology of the system relating 
individual roles to the hierarchies and hierarchies to each other in turn. (4) Latent-pattern 
Maintenance and Tension Management – The function of preserving the values of the system 
against cultural and motivational pressures is provided by the role of the expert or professional in 
all three groups of actors in the system“ (Dunlop 1958: 30). 
Dunlop uses Parsons' „pattern variables“ as a classification scheme for the 
presentation of system components („rules“, „hierarchies“, „ideologies“, and 
„experts“) which he considers relevant to his comparison of national industrial 
relations systems. However, Dunlop subscribes only formally to Parsons' ideas. In 
fact, he does little more than presenting his own understanding of industrial relations 
in the Parsonian language of the AGIL scheme. Neither in the theoretical outline nor 
in the comparative study do Parsons' insights in the four functional imperatives guide 
Dunlop's conception of an industrial relations system. 
Dunlop's own theory is based on four „elements“ which appear in various 
constellations in the above quotation: actors, contexts, ideologies, and rules. The 
separate existence or „autonomy“ of industrial relations systems is shaped by these 
four „elements“. Dunlop discusses them separately in his theoretical outline, in which 
he characterises the „elements“ as follows: the three main actors are management, 
workers and government agencies; contexts consist of technology, market constraints, 
and the power distribution in society; and the ideologies of the actors must resume 
around a common set of ideas that guides the allocation of acceptable roles to the 
actors. The last, and most crucial „element“ in Dunlop's theory of autonomous 
industrial relations, is the concept of rules governing the relations of industrial actors. 
This body of rules, which includes rules on procedures for the establishment and 
                                                          
4 In the 1993 edition of Industrial Relations Systems the „note” was omitted. 
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administration of substantive rules, constitutes „the center of attention in an 
industrial-relations system“ (Dunlop 1958: 13). In Dunlop's view, the specific 
character of industrial relations systems derives from rule making independent of 
decision-making in the economic system. 
Dunlop's „elements“ have been widely discussed in industrial relations theory. 
Shalev, for example, criticises Dunlop for a meaningless use of the ideological factor: 
„his materialistic theoretical bias, explicitly seeking in 'technological and market 
forces' rather than 'political and ideological considerations' the key to national 
diversity in industrial relations, precluded meaningful utilisation of ideology as an 
important variable.“ (Shalev 1981: 251) The element „contexts” has been criticised of 
lacking any justification for selecting only the three factors of technology, markets 
and power. Other authors argue that the element „actors“ needs further 
differentiation. Employees should be divided into organised and non-organised 
employees and employers into employer associations and single members (for 
references see Schienstock 1982: 40-46). However, these authors misunderstand 
Dunlop's abstract notion of the tripartite structure of actors. As part of the tripartite 
relationship, each actor is conceived in Dunlop's model as a complex and 
hierarchically ordered entity whereby their respective hierarchies influence – and are 
influenced by – rule making and the substance of the rules of the industrial relations 
system (see also Schienstock 1982: 40). 
In general, Dunlop's elements must be criticised for a lack of theoretical 
deduction. There is no definition of „element“ in his theory, and it is probably 
impossible to find a unifying characteristic of those heterogeneous factors which 
Dunlop calls elements. Dunlop reveals a lack of rigour in this respect in his 
theoretical discussion. 
Dunlop uses various, not always coherent, approaches to discuss or to classify 
rules and procedures. His main scheme of rules reflects his distinction of „elements“ 
and operates with five „ideal types“ of industrial relations rules and procedures, all 
linked to the three „actors“ and their relationships (Dunlop 1958: 13-16; 34-58; 76-
77; 92-93; 127; 342-379). Rules and procedures are determined for Dunlop by (a) 
managerial hierarchy; (b) specialised governmental agencies; (c) worker hierarchy; 
(d) joint management and worker hierarchy; and (e) tripartite rule making of 
management, workers and state agencies. In addition he sometimes uses distinctions 
which are close to legal classifications when he separates administrative regulations, 
collective agreements and customs and traditions in the work place. In a more 
descriptive fashion he also distinguishes between compensation rules, disciplinary 
rules, and job aspiration rules. 
Dunlop's analysis of rules and rule making can be criticised on a number of 
points. In trying to advance beyond descriptions in his analysis of rules, he merely 
mentions different sources of rule making. He does not, however, discriminate 
between those sources that are internal and those that are external to the industrial 
relations system. Dunlop can be criticised in general for economic reductionism, 
which is expressed in a tendency to view the „economic development“ as ultimately 
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responsible for rules and rule making: „Industrialization proliferates rules“ (Dunlop 
1958: 343). 
My main criticism is related to Dunlop's lack of analysis of the actual process of 
rule making. Although it is emphasised throughout his study that rule making creates 
the centre of the theory of industrial relations, he is ultimately unable to analyse 
within the limits of his methodology how these rules are created by the system. 
Schienstock rightly criticises Dunlop for neglecting decision-making processes and 
for conceiving actors only as structural entities (Schienstock 1982: 40-46 and 55-59). 
Dunlop makes no effort to study the actual processes that generate the stable „grid of 
rules” at the various levels of national industrial relations systems. 
It is both astonishing and revealing that Dunlop's theory of industrial relations 
systematically neglects not only the contribution of collective bargaining and 
grievance procedures to rule making but the analysis of collective bargaining as such 
(see also Meltz 1991: 13-4)5. There is no separate analysis of the process and 
structure of collective bargaining and arbitration procedures in his analytical study of 
industrial relations systems. Grievance procedures are only briefly discussed at a late 
stage of the analysis where they are conceived solely as mechanisms for the settlement 
of disputes but not as mechanisms for generating rules (Dunlop 1958: 367). 
Furthermore, his approach to procedures is half-hearted. Procedures are not 
important as an independent object of Dunlop's theoretical and comparative study but 
only insofar as „procedures are themselves rules“ (Dunlop 1958: 13). Dunlop is 
preoccupied with the substantive content of rules, which supposedly reveals a higher 
degree of uniformity than procedural rules. Unfortunately, he makes no use of his 
observation that institutional forms of rule application or procedures „particularly 
well reflect the characteristics of a national industrial relations system“ (Dunlop 
1958: 367). The assumption that „a diversity of procedures may still result in similar 
substantive rules“ (Dunlop 1958: 26) seems to justify an almost complete neglect of 
the study of procedures in his comparison. 
The theoretical and practical limits of Dunlop's systems-theoretical endeavour to 
analyse the industrial relations system can be further demonstrated with respect to his 
analysis of the unity of the industrial relations system. In the last section of his 
theoretical „note” Dunlop tries to show how differentiation within the AGIL pattern 
of Parsons' functional imperatives contributes to establishing the „unity“ of an 
industrial relations system: 
„It can be seen how each of these functional differentiations contribute to each other and to 
the unity of an industrial-relations system. (A-G) The rule making contributes to the attainment of 
stability and survival, and stability in turn requires a grid of rules. (A-L) The technical problems 
involved in rule making contribute to enhance the role of the professional or expert, and his role in 
turn produces a reduction of tension (a literal drawing of the „heat“) among the actors and is the 
repository and defender of the values of the system. (G-I) The attainment of stability and survival 
requires shared understandings relating the actors to each other, and an effective integration 
                                                          
5 In later studies Dunlop showed some interest in the analysis of negotiations and collective 
dispute-resolution mechanisms. See Dunlop 1984. 
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contributes to the achievement of stability and survival. (L-I) The reduction in tensions and the 
preservation of values contributed by the professionals is a force for integration, and the shared 
understandings contribute toward enhancing and maintaining the role of the professional or expert. 
The functional differentiations of the system reinforce each other and unify the industrial-relations 
system“ (Dunlop 1958: 30-31). 
Dunlop, like Parsons, discusses the problem of unity as a problem of structure. 
Unity is conceived in this forced application of the four pattern variables as a product 
of rather static links among the system components which are supposed to reinforce 
each other and thus to contribute to system maintenance („stability“, „survival“, 
„integration“). However, achieving unity does not seem to be a problem for the system. 
The links among the system components miraculously unify the system. 
In fact, unity in this discussion is merely the construct of an external observer. It is 
not analysed as a vital concern for the industrial relations system itself. Dunlop's 
analysis conveys the impression that the problems of the system derive from external 
rather than internal sources. It is beyond Dunlop's sociological imagination that threats 
to the unity and, indeed, to the existence of the industrial relations system itself could 
derive from the internal processes and links among the system components.  
Dunlop conceptualises the industrial relations system both as a subsystem of 
society at the national level, as a system of industry-wide collective bargaining, and 
as a system of work relations in a single enterprise. Although this seems to 
correspond with common understanding in industrial relations research, it is unclear 
how this is related to his systems theory approach. Dunlop pays little attention to the 
relation of these three levels of the industrial relations system. He can therefore be 
criticised for having acknowledged the scope and the different levels of the industrial 
relations system only with respect to its external relations but not with respect to the 
internal structure and processes of the industrial relations system.  
Dunlop's approach is an input-output analysis, which places high emphasis on 
contextual factors that influence the structure of the system. Dunlop shows in detail 
how the content or substance of rules reflects the various contexts of the industrial 
relations system. The contextual influence varies inversely with the structural 
complexity of the industrial relations system: „The smaller the unit to which the term 
(industrial relations system, R.R.) is applied, the larger the context, and in general the 
larger the influence of givens outside the system“ (Dunlop 1958: 24). The idea is that 
workplace rules in a single enterprise are more influenced by technical and market 
constraints or the distribution of power in society than rules that apply to an industry 
or a national industrial relations system. The question remains, however, of what 
constitutes the „core“ of an industrial relations system which is not determined by 
external forces and which integrates both large and small units. 
In summary it can be stated that Dunlop's systems theory remains at a 
classificatory level. This is probably related to the lack of understanding of the theory 
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of structural functionalism, which he himself admitted6. Indeed, his systems-
theoretical understanding has hardly exhausted the potential of Parsons' systems 
theory to conceptualise industrial relations systems (see also Wood et al. 1975 and 
Singh 1976). Furthermore central areas of industrial relations like collective 
bargaining, arbitration, grievance handling, negotiations between worker 
representatives and management, and political exchanges at national level are either 
neglected or poorly treated in the study. Although rule making in industrial relations 
is central in Dunlop's discussion his study reveals a lack of interest in considering the 
real processes of the creation and application of rules through procedures. 
It seems due to Dunlop's rather mechanical understanding of systems theory, 
which tends to conceptualise industrial relations as a trivial machine, that he 
underestimates problems related to the internal complexity of the system. More than 
forty years after the publication of his study the reader is astonished at the lack of 
sensitivity to the threats to the system which derive from internal processes. Internal 
complexity creates problems both for the structure and for the elements of the system. 
The need to reduce internal complexity is an important reason, for example, for the 
formalisation of interactions between collective actors or between individual and 
collective actors. However, only recently have we begun to analyse these interactions 
as communication processes in which the system reproduces itself. 
The theory of social systems has evolved from a closed systems approach to an 
open systems approach and has most recently been developed into a theory of 
operationally closed but cognitively open systems. Dunlop applied the open systems 
paradigm to the study of industrial relations. In taking seriously the recent „paradigm 
shift“ in systems theory, which replaces concerns with structures and functions of 
social systems with analyses of communication processes that are constitutive of the 
self-reproduction or autopoiesis of the system, we can advance beyond the Dunlopian 
approach to industrial relations.  
2.  The Social System of Industrial Relations 
The author who stands for the recent paradigm shift towards autopoietic social 
systems theory is Niklas Luhmann. Before a concept of industrial relations based on 
Luhmann’s approach is proposed, I shall briefly indicate basic features of autopoietic 
social systems theory that I see to be relevant for a discussion of autopoietic 
industrial relations. In particular five types of social systems, which can be derived 
from Luhmann's approach, are discussed as possible candidates to characterise the 
industrial relations system as a social system. In the final parts, a proposal to define 
industrial relations as a fully-fledged autopoietic function system operating in the 
world society is presented. 
2.1 Basic Features of Autopoietic Social Systems 
                                                          
6 Dunlop thought of his own application of Parsons' system theory that it „may not be 
acceptable to Professor Parsons, and it may reflect a lack of understanding of his theoretical 
system“. See Dunlop 1958: 30, Footnote 30. 
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Luhmann’s theory overcomes the Parsonian input-output model or open systems 
approach by focussing on the social system’s capacity of self-reproduction or 
autopoiesis. Luhmann borrows the concept of autopoiesis from general systems 
theory. Autopoiesis was originally invented as a concept in biology to describe the 
essence of living organisms. In discussions within general systems theory it became a 
powerful tool in understanding the basic principles of self-reproducing and self-
organising systems. In applying the abstract autopoiesis concept Luhmann 
distinguishes between elements and structures of social systems. Self-reproduction 
occurs at the level of elements and not at the structural level. Autopoietic social 
systems are cognitively open at the structural level, but closed at the operational 
level. This is a radical solution insofar as no environmental factors can have direct 
influence on the system’s reproduction. 
Probably the most startling aspect of Luhmann’s theory is his assertion that social 
systems consist of communications. He rejects the conventional view that sociological 
analyses have to start from actions or interactions. For him communications are the 
basic elements and social systems reproduce themselves through self-reference of 
communications. Thus function systems are systems of communication. Each operates 
with specific forms of communication. Boundary maintenance is achieved within 
function systems by applying a system-specific binary code.  
Luhmann's general theory distinguishes three levels of analysis of social systems 
as systems of communication: interaction, organisation and society (Luhmann 1982, 
ch. 4). Furthermore, he distinguishes types of social systems that are characterised by 
special relations either to specific social systems or to society at large. These are 
conflict systems and immune systems. 
Luhmann describes interaction systems as social systems, which are formally 
characterised as communication between participants who are present. The presence 
of the participants enables mutual perception. Communication in interaction systems 
consists of both verbal and non-verbal communication that can be perceived. The 
perception of communication among actors who are present is always reflexive: ego's 
perception can be perceived by alter and vice versa (Luhmann 1975: 23-24). 
Luhmann distinguishes between communication and structure in interaction systems. 
The structure of interaction systems arises from mechanisms like the sequential order 
of relevant events, the use of topics or factual themes in discussions, and the 
restriction that participants are not allowed to speak at the same time, but only one 
after the other. „When such structures are formed, centered interdependencies 
emerge” (Luhmann 1995a: 415). However, the structure of interaction systems is 
ultimately shaped by the autopoietic requirement that communication must continue. 
Structures of interaction systems are not particularly stable. Topics or themes can be 
changed easily and the participants have time constraints due to other commitments. 
Structurally interaction systems show a low degree of autonomy. Interactions are 
episodes with a strong tendency to disappear when the communications among 
present actors ends. To become interaction systems, episodes must be combined 
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(Luhmann 1995a: 406/7). In addition, interactions must be able to reproduce 
themselves through self-constituting self-reference.  
The second type of social system, organisation, is characterised by a form of 
communication without those communicating having to be present. The most 
important aspect of organisations is membership. The relationship between the 
organisation and its members is impersonal. Organisations operate with particular 
forms of communications. These are decisions. Thus the autopoiesis of organisations 
is conceived as the recursive communication of decisions. Only on this basis can 
structures, like organisational goals and programs, internal hierarchies, or 
membership rules, emerge7. 
In Luhmann’s theory of social systems as systems of communication 
contradictions and conflicts play an important role. Social systems create 
contradictions through communication of negation. Contradictions form part of the 
self-reference of social systems. Contradictions are a result of the requirement of 
unity of the three elements of communication: information, utterance and 
understanding. „Only a communication’s expectation of unity constitutes a 
contradiction, by choosing what communication brings together. Contradictions 
emerge by being communicated.“ (Luhmann 1995a: 365) Contradictions and 
conflicts operate with negative communication relations either to another social 
system or to society at large. They create the basis for two types of social systems, 
which are called conflict system and immune system.  
For Luhmann, a conflict system is characterised by four aspects: contradiction, 
conflict, negative double contingency, and a parasitic position inside another social 
system. Contradiction is defined as non-acceptance of a communication or, in other 
words, a situation in which expectations are not fulfilled. A contradiction only becomes 
a conflict when the contradiction is voiced and the refusal of expectations is 
communicated back as negation of the communication. Luhmann acknowledges the 
possibility of a conflict system, based on recursively communicated negations, which 
becomes an independent social system of a particular kind (Luhmann 1995a: 388-390). 
In interactional conflict systems, the situation of double contingency is redefined as one 
of „negative“ double contingency in which ego refuses to do what alter wishes since 
ego expects alter not to do what ego wants. In itself, this alternative of a reversed 
structure of expectations is highly integrative, allowing a wide range of actions to be 
incorporated within the basic assumption of opposition. Anything that can be assumed 
to be detrimental to the other party is potentially part of a conflict system. The 
destructive consequences of the new conflict system are thus felt in the social system in 
which the conflict system originated. For Luhmann a conflict can develop into an 
                                                          
7 „Die folgenden Überlegungen gehen davon aus, daß Organisationen entstehen und sich 
reproduzieren, wenn es zur Kommunikation von Entscheidungen kommt und das System auf 
dieser Operationsbasis operativ geschlossen wird. Alles andere – Ziele, Hierarchien, Rationa-
litätschancen, weisungsgebundene Mitglieder, oder was sonst als Kriterium von Organisation 
angesehen wird – ist demgegenüber sekundär und kann als Resultat der Entscheidungs-
operationen des Systems angesehen werden.” (Luhmann 1995b: 23, Luhmann‘s emphasis). 
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independent conflict system only within another social system. From the covering 
system's point of view the conflict system is the „excluded, included third“ (Luhmann 
1988: 212). Luhmann describes this relationship with a rather unfortunate biological 
metaphor as a relationship between a non-symbiotic parasite and its host. The metaphor 
is borrowed from Michel Serres' study on „social parasites” (Serres 1980). The conflict 
system is „parasitic“ in the sense that it absorbs attention and resources of the „host“ 
system.  
However, contradictions and conflicts circulate in society and can be activated 
against societal structures. And to some extent society needs to protect itself from the 
destructive consequences of conflicts. This is the starting point for Luhmann to 
conceptualise a different type of social system which he calls the immune system that 
protects society at large. The idea of an immune system is not simply to protect society 
from conflicts. Its function is not to maintain attacked structures and to restore the status 
quo but to protect autopoiesis. The function of a social immune system lies in the 
continuation of communication by other means. Thus immune systems do not avoid 
conflicts but merely offer suitable forms of communication. The overriding aim is to 
avoid the use of open violence that, among other negative consequences, interrupts 
communication necessary for the self-reproduction of society (Luhmann 1995a: 369). 
In Luhmann’s theory society is the overarching social system that includes all 
other social systems. Society is primarily differentiated into function systems. The 
major function systems are law, politics, economy, art, education, religion, Luhmann 
transcends Parsons’ approach of viewing society as being controlled by (only) four 
pattern variables (Luhmann 1982, ch. 3). For Luhmann the modern society does not 
consist of a fixed number of function systems. There is always the possibility of new 
function systems that manages to achieve operational closure. However, this happens 
nowadays increasingly under conditions established by the emerging world society 
(Luhmann 1997, Vol. II: 760/1). 
2.2 Five Types of Social Systems 
We can deduce from our short introduction of Luhmann's theory five types of 
social systems as possible candidates to characterise industrial relations as a social 
system. First, there are the three types of social system: interaction system, 
organisation system, and function system of society. Second, there are the two 
additional types that operate with contradicting communication relations either in 
relation to another social system or to society at large, which are called conflict 
system and immune system accordingly.  
2.2.1 Industrial relations as a set of interaction systems 
An analysis of industrial relations as interaction systems focuses on the systems 
of negotiations in which actors are present. These are in particular collective 
negotiations, generally known as collective bargaining. The communication in 
collective bargaining is structured by an agenda, by topics and by a procedure that 
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prescribes formal rules of participation in communications. These negotiations are 
episodes that are linked through their results, i.e. collective bargaining agreements, 
which are supposed to be renegotiated after a certain period of time. Indeed, 
combination of episodes (Teubner 1987b) is a mechanism that equally applies to the 
industrial relations system. Interactions are episodes in the „carrying on“ of society. 
Structures created in industrial relations episodes are used in later episodes. 
Independent industrial relations discourses with elaborate grievance procedures and 
collective bargaining styles evolve from these structures. In the end an industrial 
relations culture evolves. 
Interaction systems of the industrial relations system have generally achieved a 
high degree of structural autonomy. Collective bargaining and grievance procedures 
both define which claim or grievance they can process in procedures that are 
established by the systems themselves. These negotiation systems define their 
communicative elements through self-reference and are therefore autopoietic systems. 
The industrial relations literature provides many descriptions of the autonomous 
character of collective bargaining that allude to self-reproductive concerns of the 
industrial relations system. Wolfgang-Ulrich Prigge, for example, defines collective 
bargaining as a negotiation system of interorganizational self-governance which is 
able to determine topics of discussion, processes or phases of negotiations and the 
roles of the negotiators (Prigge 1987: 33-5)8. And Walther Müller-Jentsch describes 
autonomous collective bargaining as consisting of the two related aspects of conflict 
resolution and rule making (Müller-Jentsch 1986, ch. 12). 
Industrial relations communications are not only the result of interactions but 
they also describe themselves as industrial relations negotiations. Furthermore, 
collective bargaining negotiations link as interaction systems through mutual 
recognition. They form a set of independent interaction systems. 
If industrial relations are viewed as a set or combination of interaction systems, 
it might be asked if the set itself has evolved into a new kind of system through the 
combination of interaction systems. The set might have achieved the capacity to 
define the various interaction systems as its elements. In this case negotiations in 
industrial relations interaction systems are no longer randomly related communicative 
episodes. These interaction systems might be linked through their communications. 
Several other system components of interaction systems might be related according to 
a higher, or second order which has evolved at the level of industrial relations at 
large. In this case it would be insufficient to describe industrial relations only in terms 
of a set of loosely related interaction systems. 
2.2.2 Industrial relations as a hypercyclically constituted network of organisations 
An approach to analyse industrial relations as a second order system is to use 
organisation and network theories. Organisation theory can be applied at two levels: 
                                                          
8 Prigge's approach is an open systems approach. His input-output analysis focuses on 
institutional structures rather than communication processes. 
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at the level of participants of industrial relations interactions and at the level of the 
industrial relations system at large.  
The organisational account of industrial relations usually focuses on the special 
characteristics of industrial relations as interactions between organisations of 
employees and employers. Unions or worker representatives and employer 
associations or employer representatives carry out collective bargaining on a meso-
level of industry or region and on a micro-level in the company or the plant.  
The topics of industrial relations communications are the result of organisational 
processes. Claims in collective bargaining are generated in internal processes within 
unions and employer associations. However, industrial relations research has shown 
that the relation between the size of the claim and the outcome of bargaining is rather 
constant over time9. This finding can be interpreted from a systems theoretical point 
of view to indicate both the separate existence and the links between the claims-
generating organisations and the negotiation system. The organisations that are 
responsible for the claims recognise the separate existence of the negotiation system 
by referring to experiences with claims in previous negotiations. Unions and 
employers define their roles by referring to the negotiation system and to its 
conditions which influence the generation of claims.  
It is thus necessary to switch attention to the collective negotiation system as 
such. There are a few accounts in industrial relations research that use variants of 
organisation theory to describe the negotiation system. Allan Flanders, for example, 
characterises it as a political institution. He emphasises the power relationship 
between organisations and, in particular, the capacity of collective bargaining to 
establish rules as an alternative to statutory regulation (Flanders 1970: 220-1). One 
could also think of applying the systems theoretical view on autopoietic organisations 
(see for example Teubner 1987a; Luhmann 1995b; Baecker 1999). 
However, a certain uneasiness remains in viewing the industrial relations system 
simply as an organisation system. Most industrial relations systems are certainly 
capable of communicating their internally achieved results to the external world 
(Luhmann 1990a: 672-687, discussed in relation to scientific and academic 
organisations). They define themselves through membership by inclusion of certain 
collective actors and by exclusion of others. They can isolate themselves from social 
and psychic conditions in order to follow self-generated programs and they are able 
to generate their own „media of positions” (Luhmann 1988, ch. 9, discussed in 
relation to economic organisations).  
Nevertheless, there is something specific about industrial relations, which is not 
captured by this description. This is related to the fact that the main instrument for 
self-regulation and the creation of internal structures is a mutual agreement. Thus a 
further qualification of the organisational type of social system seems necessary. Of 
assistance can be Teubner’s research on networks as autopoietic systems of a higher 
                                                          
9 Hansjörg Weitbrecht reports that the outcome of negotiations in the German metal industry 
remained at a level of two-third of the union claim from 1948 to 1966. See Weitbrecht 1969: 145. 
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order that result from a combination of the two types of social institution „contract“ 
and „organisation” (Teubner 1993). „By contrast with contract and organisation, 
networks are higher-order autopoietic systems, to the extent that they set up emergent 
elementary acts (network operations) through dual attribution, and link these up in 
circular fashion into an operational system. They are systems which are formed 
through a combination of contract and organisations and which possess the major 
features of an autopoietic system” (Teubner 1993: 50). Networks are collective 
actors, which act through other collective actors. For Teubner, examples of networks 
as collective actors are the „legal hybrids“ franchises and joint ventures. 
In applying Teubner's idea of a hypercyclically constituted network, it can be 
argued that collective bargaining develops into an autonomous network system 
between organisations that becomes able to define both its norms and the status of its 
members, i.e., the participating collective actors. Collective bargaining creates 
mechanisms of self-observation and self-constitution produce its own institutional 
structures. The network collective bargaining system is a collective actor that acts 
through other collective actors. Thus interactions of unions and employer associations 
form a network which produces norms, defines a space and forms a unity.  
2.2.3 Industrial relations as a conflict system 
With respect to intersystemic links Luhmann's theory of social systems offers a 
unique option to conceptualise the industrial relations system as a social system. This 
option is the conflict system that develops within another social system. A conflict 
system takes part in communications of the host system by switching to contradictions, 
thereby opposing the host system’s communication on principle. Contradictions enable 
the continuation of action in the absence of the certainty of expectations. 
Luhmann emphasises the destabilising effects of contradictions on the social 
system. However, this destabilisation is not considered dysfunctional but rather 
supportive for the evolution of the system. In certain situations the conflict system 
achieves that structures of the host system are replaced in order to maintain the 
autopoietic reproduction of the system. Complex social systems need a certain amount 
of instability to become able to react towards perturbations both within the environment 
and within themselves. Examples are changing prices in the economic system, a legal 
concept in which criticism and even change of the law becomes a normal event and 
marriages, which can be terminated by divorce. Contradictions are the communication 
of „no“ and protect the system against petrification (Luhmann 1995a: 388-397). 
Luhmann has not directly applied the idea of a conflict system to industrial 
relations. In his Die Wirtschaft der Gesellschaft (The economy of society), he only 
mentions the problem of „Labour“ as an example of the general problem of scarcity 
in economics. In this context „Labour“ is described as a „parasite“ of the economic 
system (Luhmann 1988: 212-223) and industrial relations are mainly treated as being 
an old-fashioned semantic of „Capital“ vs. „Labour“. Although Luhmann does not 
contest that workers need organised representation of workers' interests (Luhmann 
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1988: 171), he criticises unions for protecting interests in a mode which leads to 
inflexible labour markets. Luhmann only discusses industrial relations from an 
economic perspective, in which trade unions are described as instruments to increase 
the price of labour without any discussion of their wider role in society (Luhmann 
1988: 223-224).  
For Luhmann conflict systems endure when the conflict can be interpreted to 
show signs of general societal relevance beyond the limits of the specific interaction. 
Luhmann sees law and morality as mechanisms that can operationalise societal 
relevance of conflicts in interaction systems. Where law and morality fail to upgrade 
or select individual conflicts as „socially relevant“, specific organisations fulfil this 
function. Luhmann proposes that trade unions can be seen as organisations that select 
particular conflicts and enhance their status as relevant for the society at large 
(Luhmann 1995a: 393). 
Luhmann's brief analysis of generalisation of the conflict within the conflict 
system (Luhmann 1995a: 392-393) does not consider repercussive effects of the 
generalisation on the conflict system as such. In Luhmann's approach there is no 
possibility that the conflict system might transform into a different type of system10. 
Thus in his account, a conflict system remains a conflict system despite a tendency 
towards generalisation of conflicts. 
However, an alternative scenario can be proposed, that assumes a transformation 
of the very character of a conflict system through generalisation. It assumes that the 
conflict system can reach a level of autonomy that allows the transformation from 
negative communication to positive communication. During this process negative 
double contingency is transformed into positive double contingency. An example can 
be the development of those industrial relations systems that switch from conflictual 
communications to joint decision-making. These industrial relations systems change 
their reproductive basis from negative to positive forms of communication. Thus the 
generalisation of conflicts within a particular host system, which no longer defines 
the reason for conflicts as half-heartedly included thirds but as own systems problems 
of wider societal relevance, not only helps to preserve the conflict system but 
transforms the conflict system from an interaction system into a different form of 
social system. The conflict system acquires a new identity during this transformation 
process and domesticates conflict through limiting negative double contingency to 
situations of adversary negotiations and collective bargaining. 
2.2.4 Industrial relations as an immune system of society 
                                                          
10 In his last major publication, Luhmann discusses social movements as a new type of social 
system (Luhmann 1997: 847-865). However, he does not view them on the same level as the 
other types of social system, in particular interactions and organisations (Luhmann 1997: 
813). I thus refrain from discussing this option („a sixth option”), without, however, denying 
the possibility to describe industrial relations in this way. The labour movement and industrial 
relations could indeed be analysed in terms of an autopoietic social movement.  
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Luhmann's theory offers a fourth possibility to conceptualise the industrial 
relations system. This is to perceive it as an immune system of society.  
Luhmann has demonstrated his idea of a societal immune system with respect to 
the legal system (Luhmann 1995a: 373-376). The legal system serves as the prime 
immune system of society, which guarantees communication of expectations even in 
case of contradiction. It permits societal communication to resort to legal forms of 
communication in the case of communicative breakdown in every-day life situations. 
The legal system operates as an immune system of society by anticipating uncertainties 
and instabilities internally before these uncertainties and instabilities occur in society. 
Law is created in anticipation of possible conflicts. It secures the continuation of 
communication in a modified form in case of contradiction in normal communications. 
Law selects certain expectations and protects them in case of conflict, which creates the 
basis of normativity of expectations. Experiences with conflict are generalised for this 
reason in anticipation of future conflicts. In modern societies law invents new problem 
constellations which in fact, nobody would have thought of, if law did not exist. And 
law declares the expectations, which arise from new problem constellations to be law. 
Thus law does not serve the function of avoiding conflicts but, in fact, increases the 
chances for conflict. It simply tries to avoid the violent carrying on of conflicts by 
providing a means of communication adequate to the conflict. In Luhmann’s words: 
„Law serves to continue communication by other means“ (Luhmann 1995a: 375). Law 
is societally adequate when it is able to generate enough conflicts and enough internal 
complexity to manage these problems.  
The industrial relations system can be conceptualised as an immune system 
similar to the legal system. The industrial relations system complements the legal 
system in its role as the immune system for society. In a way the industrial relations 
system serves as a second immune system because of the limited capacity of the legal 
system in handling conflicts. The legal system requires conflicts to be transformed into 
individual claims before they can be handled within the system. The industrial relations 
system is the second immune system of society, which handles collective conflicts. It 
serves to continue communication in the case of collective conflicts. It provides 
procedures that transform violent collective conflicts into negotiations.  
Luhmann's „social immunology“ could be further advanced by applying the 
concept of immune systems to the study of functional subsystems of society. A good 
example of immune systems at the level of concrete social systems is the industrial 
relations system. Thus, in addition to the general character of the industrial relations 
system as an immune system of society, we find a system-specific immune system 
within the industrial relations system. This system is the grievance procedure and 
arbitration system, which serves in the capacity of an immune system in the collective 
bargaining system (see Rogowski forthcoming). 
2.2.5 Industrial relations as a functionally differentiated societal subsystem 
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The four previous characterisations of industrial relations as a social system do 
not preclude the conceptualisation of the industrial relations system as a functionally 
differentiated societal system on the same plane as the legal, the economic or the 
political system.  
Teubner's application of the idea of a hypercycle, derived from biochemical 
theories on the origin of life, is not restricted to the emergence of organisations as 
autopoietic systems. It is equally applicable to the evolution of functional subsystems 
of society.  
Teubner describes autopoiesis as resulting from a three-step autonomisation of 
social systems from self-observation to self-description to autopoiesis of social 
systems. Autopoiesis or self-reproduction emerges from a cyclical relation of cyclical 
system components (= hypercycle)11. 
Teubner proposes a gradual evolution of autopoietic systems. He assumes that 
self-reference is not limited to elements (parts) but occurs with respect to other 
system components, i.e., structure (networks), process (production), boundary and 
environment (space) and the system as a whole (unity). For Teubner the hypercycle, 
i.e. cyclical combination of cyclical self-description of self-reference, is thus not 
confined to self-reference of elements but equally applies to the other system 
components. 
Teubner has demonstrated the idea of a hypercycle with respect to the cyclical 
relations of the four components of the legal system: legal procedure, legal action, 
legal norm, and legal doctrine. In the development of the legal system from diffuse 
societal law to a state of relative autonomy, and then to full autopoiesis, these 
components first acquire identity by a process of self-reference, then are used 
operationally as self-descriptions of the legal system and finally are connected 
hypercyclically in a third process to form the autopoietic legal system (Teubner 1989, 
graph on p. 50).  
It is possible to construct an autopoietic industrial relations system in analogy to 
Teubner's construction of an autopoietic legal system. Procedures, action, norms and a 
retained body of knowledge can be found in the industrial relations system as well. 
Teubner distinguishes three stages in the evolution of a legal system: Diffuse 
societal law, relatively autonomous law, and autopoietic law. Industrial relations 
consist of diffuse societally produced system components. Workplace industrial 
relations rules, which are not introduced through procedures but are followed 
                                                          
11 Teubner 1989: 44: „Gesellschaftliche Teilsysteme gewinnen an Autonomie, wenn im 
Subsystem die Systemkomponenten (Element, Struktur, Prozess, Identität, Grenze, Umwelt, 
Leistung, Funktion) selbstreferentiell definiert sind (= Selbstbeobachtung), wenn zusätzlich 
diese Selbstbeobachtungen als Selbstbeschreibungen im System operativ verwendet werden  
(= Selbstkonstitution) und wenn schließlich in einem Hyperzyklus die selbstkonstituierten 
Systemkomponenten als einander wechselseitig produzierend miteinander verkettet werden (= 
Autopoiesis)“. 
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repetitiously for reasons of tradition, are examples of such a state of an industrial 
relations system. 
An industrial relations system has become partly autonomous when one or more 
of its components become self-referential. Examples of this, by analogy to secondary 
legal rules, are norms of recognition of employee representatives in grievance 
procedures or collective bargaining, which regulate the creation of norms. 
The industrial relations system is hypercyclically structured when its 
components are not only engaged in self-reference but when the relations of its 
components become recursive. In an autopoietic system the elements rely on 
references to other system components to constitute themselves. Elements and 
structure become two mutually referential system components. Actions of the 
industrial relations system (elements) are used to define rules (structure) and rules are 
used to define industrial relations action (which should not be confused with 
industrial action).  
Teubner's hypercycle concept is thus highly suggestive of a conception of an 
industrial relations system as a social system. It differs from Luhmann's concept 
which insists that autopoiesis characterises all social systems and that social systems 
are by definition autopoietic and cannot be partly autopoietic and partly allopoietic 
(Luhmann 1987a: 318-319). According to Luhmann social systems do not differ with 
respect to autopoiesis. They can only differ with respect to the degree of 
differentiation from their societal and other environments and with respect to the 
degree of internal and external complexity.  
Teubner's concept has the advantage of discussing the crucial question of the 
historical origin of autopoietic systems. Luhmann's approach seems contradictory in 
this respect because he adheres to a theory of differentiation of society in which 
autopoietic function systems are achievements of evolutionary processes but he 
resists conceptualising the historical origins of a particular social system before it has 
become an autopoietic social system. 
3. The Industrial Relations System as a Function System of Society.  
A Proposal 
I propose to view the industrial relations system as a functional subsystem of 
society on the same plane as the legal, the economic or the science systems. The 
industrial relations system has constituted itself as a fully-fledged functional social 
system. Although it is possible to characterise it as a conflict system within the 
economic system and as an immune system of society, these characterisations cannot 
grasp the entire nature of the industrial relations system in modern societies. Thus, in 
my view the modern industrial relations system is best understood as a functionally 
differentiated subsystem of society. 
This proposal can be demonstrated by discussing the four hypotheses which 
Luhmann has outlined in his analysis of the economic system as a „catalogue“ for the 
empirical testing of the existence of a social subsystem (Luhmann 1988: 51). In 
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applying these hypotheses the industrial relations system can be characterised in the 
following way: 
 Form and scope of differentiation have reached a level in modern societies which 
makes an autonomous industrial relation system possible that is not dominated by 
other function systems. 
 The industrial relations system operates with a specific combination of closure and 
openness with respect to its elementary operations. 
 The industrial relations system operates under a binary code, which represents the 
exclusive function of the system. 
 The industrial relations system has achieved a relative prominence in society at 
large in its ability to arrange corporatist exchange relations with other function 
systems to further its autonomy. 
The following outline of the proposal for a model of industrial relations as a 
social system discusses these four hypotheses separately. 
3.1 Differentiation of an Industrial Relations System 
Modern societies are functionally differentiated societies. Such a society has 
overcome the hierarchical mode of integration which was characteristic of 
stratificatory societies. A primary mode of integration in modern societies is a 
vertical order of mutual recognition of functional subsystems. Each function system 
is exclusively responsible for fulfilling its societal function.  
It has been said that the industrial relations system is not a full-blown 
autopoietic system. Teubner argues in analogy to his idea of steps in the 
autonomisation of the legal system that the industrial relations system consists of 
autopoietic interaction systems but lacks the hypercycle of recursive relations of 
system components and, therefore, has not yet reached the status of a functionally 
differentiated autopoietic system on the same plane as the economic or the legal 
system (Teubner 1989: 49-56). In my view this is partly a question for the theory of 
an autopoietic industrial relations system and partly an empirical question about the 
stage in the development in the industrial relations system. My preliminary answer is 
that more signs point in the direction of a fully-fledged autopoietic function system.  
Self-reference of the elements of the industrial relations system is not only a 
theoretical supposition but also an empirically observable phenomenon. Institutions and 
the structure of the industrial relations system are based on self-reference. However 
self-reference of collective communications is a highly improbable process.  
In modern societies industrial relations have developed into autopoietic function 
systems which are recognised by other function systems. Industrial relations have 
developed from a conflict system into a societal subsystem, which defines itself with 
respect to fulfilling a function in society at large. And the function of the industrial 
relations system is to manage collective violence, which can occur in the relations 
between industrial interest groups.  
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Luhmann touches upon „Labour“ and its semantic opposition „Capital“ in his 
discussion of classes in society. He views class theory as a peculiar form of self-
description of the modern society at large. Luhmann admits that the opposition of 
„Capital“ vs. „Labour“ as representing two classes of society has advanced beyond a 
mere scientific analysis of society and has achieved the status of a widely shared self-
description of society. However, for Luhmann class society means a self-description 
of the modern society as a hierarchically ordered society. Thus, the semantic of 
„Capital“ and „Labour“ represents an inadequate self-description of modern society. 
It is an attempt of society to resist recognition of its functional differentiation into 
polycentric, horizontally ordered function systems (Luhmann 1985b: 148-150 and 
1988b: 168-176)12.  
If Luhmann had studied the self-descriptions of the industrial relations system, 
he might have detected that it has achieved the status of an independent function 
system in society. The opposition of labour and capital has formed a negotiation 
system, which has become self-reproductive.  
The industrial relations system is characterised by special forms of interactions 
between collective actors, imost important strike activities. The understanding of 
these interactions has changed. These changes in the self-descriptions indicate a 
development of the industrial relations system. Whereas the modes of regulation of 
strikes are the main concerns of industrial relations in its pre-autopoietic phase, the 
nature of its elements, i.e., collective negotiations, as conflictual or co-operative 
becomes prevalent in autopoietic industrial relations. Thus the self-descriptions of the 
system increasingly relate to the self-reproduction of its basic communications. 
Industrial democracy is a form of self-description of industrial relations which 
emphasises codetermination or participation between the collective actors.  
These self-descriptions also reflect different forms of regulation of the industrial 
relations system, and in particular the transformation from external regulation to self-
regulation. Regulation of industrial relations has historically evolved from regulation 
of industrial action, to regulation of arbitration and other forms of third party 
facilitation to self-regulation of negotiations by self-created agreements. This history 
of industrial relations is reflected in the order of regulatory instruments in modern 
collective bargaining. However, it appears in this order in a reversed form: First 
negotiation, then arbitration, then industrial action (Müller-Jentsch 1983).  
Industrial relations fulfil the societal function of managing conflicts between 
collective actors. From the society's point of view the function of industrial relations 
is the management of collective violence. However, modern industrial relations have 
advanced beyond the status of a conflict system. Interaction of collective actors 
                                                          
12 Luhmann holds the Marxist „semantic“ of „Capital“ and „Labour“ responsible for diverting 
societal communication from discussing the real problems of modern societies by triggering 
and perpetuating conflicts which are unrelated to the overwhelming and urgent „ecological“ 
dangers of our societies. See Luhmann 1988: 169. 
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occurs in the shadow of conflicts, i.e., strikes and lockouts. Negotiations both avoid 
and make creative use of these forms of collective behaviour or collective violence. 
Most industrial relations systems are conflict systems in the beginning of their 
development. However, once industrial relations systems have developed structures 
of formalised negotiations, they acquire a function as institutions of conflict 
resolution for both the host system and society. 
Otto Kahn-Freund has provided insightful remarks on how autonomous 
industrial relations, which manage conflict to achieve a number of purposes, can 
nevertheless revert to open conflict systems. He defines as the „cardinal feature of 
labour-management relations“ that „it is the conflict itself which gives rise to the 
formation and consolidation of groups and to the establishment of the relevant social 
relations as group relations“ (in „Intergroup Conflicts and Their Settlement“ in Kahn-
Freund 1978: 42). 
For Kahn-Freund it is not so much the aspect of the conflict relation defined as 
„negative communication“ between the collective actors but the conflict as form of 
interaction between unions and employers' associations which leads to progress in the 
industrial relations system. Open conflict is gradually reduced and transformed into an 
instrument, which becomes „the sparingly used ultima ratio in the arsenal of the 
groups“. However, Kahn-Freund noticed a danger of reversal to „primitive“ forms of 
conflict behaviour in complex conflict systems which rests on intergroup relations: 
„Eventually this may lead to a situation in which the element of spontaneity appears in the 
intragroup rather than the intergroup sphere: The dissatisfaction of the workers may be directed 
against the union itself on account of the deliberateness and moderation of its action. It may find 
expression in 'unofficial' or 'wildcat' strikes, i.e., labour conflicts conducted on the workers' side by 
spontaneous and ephemeral 'strike committees' frowned upon by the recognised unions. At this 
point the story of the eternal dialectic of spontaneity and organisation in labour relations may return 
to its beginning: the danger of a relapse into more primitive forms of conduct is inherent in the 
rigidity of the social patterns of the labour dispute at the highest point of its development.“ (Kahn-
Freund 1978: 44-45) 
Thus Kahn-Freund is well aware that industrial relations remains a conflict 
system which can reverse into open conflict. However, joint decision-making 
introduces a new quality to the relation of collective actors. The perception of 
industrial action as disruption of communication, even beyond the realm of industrial 
relations within the industrial relations system, leads to a new understanding of 
industrial action. Industrial relations become responsive to societal needs, which are 
mainly expressed in the form of dissatisfaction with collective violence. 
Industrial relations maintain the character of a conflict system when the relations of 
unions and employers are dominated by what industrial relations research has coined the 
adversarial principle (see Barbash 1979 and 1984). Adverse industrial relations operate 
under the maxim „what is bad for my enemy is good for myself“. As long as this attitude 
dominates the behaviour of actors the autonomisation of the industrial relations system 
is inhibited. The communication in the conflict system is restricted to negative 
communications with the „host“ system. However, in reality industrial relations create 
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themselves through their own communication structures, which substitute for the 
dependency on negative links with the economic communications. 
3.2 Operational Closure and Cognitive Openness  
Autopoietic industrial relations are operationally closed and cognitively open. 
The elements of the industrial relations system, i.e., its communications, are 
constituted in self-referentially closed operations. Because autopoiesis or self-
reproduction is guaranteed by closed communication circuits, the industrial relations 
system can be open towards its societal environment.  
The elements of an autopoietic industrial relations system are communications 
between collective actors. If the collective communications are defined as 
negotiations they are perceived as actions of the industrial relations system. 
Negotiations within an industrial relations system can be called „industrial relations 
acts“, in analogy to „legal acts“ which Teubner proposes as the self-constituted 
elements of an autopoietic legal system (Teubner 1989: 42). 
Industrial relations acts constitute the core of the industrial relations system as a 
social system. In particular, negotiations in collective bargaining are seen as such 
industrial relations acts. Luhmann's discussion of communication, action and the 
system is directly applicable to an industrial relations system. The industrial relations 
system defines behaviour of collective actors only as industrial action if it is linked to 
negotiations within the collective bargaining system. However, this link is entirely a 
product of the collective bargaining system. Thus collective bargaining is defined as 
industrial action within the industrial relations system only when it is recognised as 
industrial action in collective bargaining.  
Furthermore, each negotiation can be seen as a form of action. The collective 
bargaining system observes and describes itself as a system of negotiations. 
Negotiations are the communications „produced“ by previous communications 
relevant to the self-reproduction of the system. Reference of negotiations in collective 
bargaining to previous negotiations contains the self-referential process, which 
guarantees the autopoiesis of the industrial relations system. Thus the realisation as 
negotiation system is the mode of self-reference which constitutes the basis of its 
autopoiesis. On this basis of operational closure the industrial relations system can be 
open to establish intersystemic links.  
Industrial relations research is used to discuss problems of operational closure 
and cognitive openness under the heading of the autonomy of industrial relations. The 
concept of autonomy of industrial relations, and in particular of collective bargaining, 
has a long history in the debates both of external regulation through state intervention 
and of self-regulation of the industrial relations system. However, autonomy is 
usually discussed with respect to the structure of the industrial relations system, and 
thus with respect to the capacity of its institutions to regulate the system's affairs. The 
system theoretical analysis relates the autonomy of the system to the self-
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reproductive processes and understands autonomy as a necessary condition to protect 
autopoiesis.  
Indeed it can be argued that the industrial relations system creates the grievances 
and claims because it defines which conflict is treated as a „grievance“ or „claim“ in 
the industrial relations system through reflexive processes. This perspective does not 
deny that grievances or claims, are defined by the individual grievant or claimant or 
by the union. It only assumes that grievances or claims when treated in the grievance 
machinery or in the collective bargaining system as products of previous 
communications inside the system, are influenced by the structure of the system 
which has a specific effect on the occurrence and definition of grievances as 
industrial relations acts.  
3.3 The Code of the Industrial Relations System and its Operation 
The core operations in the system of industrial relations are self-referential 
processes, which constitute its autopoiesis. A major pre-condition for autopoiesis is 
the ability of the system to distinguish its elementary communications. The industrial 
relations system must select its elements from societal communications. Applying a 
code, which is specific to the industrial relations system, carries out this selection of 
communication.  
Thus industrial relations must possess a binary code in order to operate as an 
autopoietic function system. With a system specific code it becomes able to draw a 
distinction between those elements which it considers to belong to the system and 
those which belong to the environment. The binary code reflects the function of the 
industrial relations system. Only if the application of the code is guaranteed can the 
industrial relations system be called autonomous and autopoietic. 
Luhmann calls the invention of codes the technically most efficient and 
consequential form of differentiation of function systems. The main function systems 
structure their communication with a binary code which claims universality with 
respect to the respective specific function and also claims the exclusion of third 
possibilities (Luhmann 1989: 36-37). 
Luhmann has analysed several binary codes of function systems. He defines the 
code for the scientific system to be the opposition of truth and untruth; the code of the 
economy is payment and non-payment; and the code of the legal system is law and 
non-law. I propose to call the binary code of the industrial relations system 
negotiable or non-negotiable between collective industrial actors. Like other binary 
codes the code of the industrial relations system entails a paradox insofar as the code 
itself cannot be justified by applying the code. The distinction between negotiable 
and not negotiable is itself not negotiable for the industrial relations system. 
It is possible to demonstrate the idea of element and structure of autopoietic 
industrial relations in reconstructing the definition of industrial relations offered by 
Walther Müller-Jentsch. This definition includes major features of a definition of 
industrial relations as an autopoietic social system. Müller-Jentsch emphasises that 
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interactions between persons, groups and organisations are the object of industrial 
relations from which norms, contracts and institutions result (Müller-Jentsch 1986)13. 
In systems theory terms he identifies interactions as relations of communications 
from which the structure of the system derives. Interactions appear in this definition 
as abstractions, which inhabit complex relations between management and 
employees, employers associations and unions or between persons, groups and 
organisations; and these relations can be conflictual or consensus oriented. However, 
the main radicalisation of autopoietic systems theory in the study of industrial 
relations lies in the analysis of the self-reproductive process. Interactions and their 
derivative institutions form conditions and programs for operational closure and 
cognitive openness. Interaction in industrial relations is communication, which 
produces communication. Collective bargaining produces new collective bargaining; 
grievance processing produces new grievance processing. 
The industrial relations system is a complex system, which creates its structure 
by selecting among certain relations of its elements. The introduction of the criterion 
collectivity is such a selection. Collectivity is both an abstraction from individual 
relations and a way to reduce the complexity of relations of employees and employers 
to those communications in which collective representatives operate on behalf of the 
employees. 
When industrial relations are conceived as social systems that operate in a society 
consisting of several functionally differentiated social systems they have to manage both 
the internal and the external complexity. In fact industrial relations have to manage a 
higher internal complexity than most other function systems of society. This is related to 
its specific form of organisation, or, more precisely, the requirement of interaction 
between organisations. The vast majority of function systems including the religious, the 
political, the economic, the legal and the scientific system, adopt organisation as their 
form of achievement of function and production of performance. In his analysis of the 
economic system (Luhmann 1988: 302-323) and the scientific system (Luhmann 1990a: 
672-680), Luhmann emphasises competition among organisations as a structural 
principle. Fulfilment of function needs openness, which is usually guaranteed by a 
plurality of organisations (competition among political parties, universities, 
corporations). Industrial relations are characterised by reflexive organisation, i.e. 
organisation of organisation. However even among reflexive organisations competition 
is possible. In addition to union competition and competition among employer 
organisations a plurality of forms of collective bargaining is possible. 
3.4 Intersystemic Relations of the Industrial Relations System in Society 
                                                          
13 Müller-Jentsch 1986: 17: „Arbeits- oder industrielle Beziehungen bezeichnen jene 
eigentümliche Zwischensphäre im Verhältnis von Management und Belegschaft, von Arbeit-
geberverbänden und Gewerkschaften, deren eigentlicher Gegenstand friedliche oder konflik-
torische Interaktionen zwischen Personen, Gruppen und Organisationen sind, sowie die aus 
solchen Interaktionen resultierenden Normen, Verträge und Institutionen.“ 
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The relation of the industrial relations system to other second order social 
systems is described by Luhmann as one of performance rather than function. In 
functionally differentiated societies social systems have to relate to each other 
„horizontally“ through performances; the function describes the relation with society. 
A relation of performance between two second order social systems is established 
when the means used by one system to achieve a certain effect in another system are 
compatible with the structure of the other system (Luhmann 1981: 84). 
Luhmann's distinction of function and performance enables one to criticise the 
inflationary use of the term function in industrial relations research. Walther Müller-
Jentsch (Müller-Jentsch 1986: 158-202), for example, defines several „functions“ of 
collective bargaining which are in some cases better described as performances of the 
industrial relations system. His list of collective bargaining functions include protection 
of living standards, distribution of income and contribution to industrial democracy are 
not only benefits for employees but also performances of the collective bargaining 
system for the economic system. The creation of uniform conditions of production 
through standardisation of wages and working time and through reinforcement of stable 
wage structures and working conditions are performances which benefit the whole 
group of employers. And the autonomy of collective bargaining benefits the state 
insofar as it relieves the political system from regulating working conditions; it 
increases rather than decreases the legitimation of the state and the government. 
Furthermore, what Walther Müller-Jentsch calls „societal effectiveness“ 
(gesellschaftliche Effektivität) of collective bargaining describes, in fact, the function of 
collective bargaining and, indeed, of the whole industrial relations system, when he 
considers it to contain and canalise conflicts (Müller-Jentsch 1986: 160).  
In describing relations between function systems Luhmann distinguishes 
between temporary performance relations and long-term structural coupling. Within 
the evolutionary process function systems have the chance to become structurally 
coupled. Important examples are the coupling of the legal and the political system via 
a constitution and the coupling of the legal and the economic system via contract and 
property (see Luhmann 1993, ch. 10). 
Industrial relations systems tend to develop their performance relations with the 
political and the legal system into intersystemic exchange relations. These exchange 
relations are often tripartite in nature with the two industrial actors interacting with 
state officials. If recurrent meetings of the three parties take place on a regular basis, 
such institution is commonly referred to as a corporatist arrangement. However, the 
intersystemic relations between the industrial relations system and its surrounding 
neighbour systems can only flourish when the industrial relations system is secure in 
its own autonomy and autopoiesis. Corporatist arrangements can only benefit the 
industrial relations system if it is strong enough to resist direct determination and can 
use corporatist arrangements for internal creation of structures. And the political and 
legal systems benefit only from participation in corporatist arrangements as long as 
the industrial relations system can offer performances, which are useful for their 
internal communications. The political and the legal system will only maintain their 
122   Ralf Rogowski: Industrial Relations as a Social System 
 
support in the long run when the industrial relations system is strong enough so that 
the other systems can receive something in return for their contribution to the 
industrial relations system which lies in their participation in corporatist networks. 
Thus autonomisation and interdependence are not exclusive but co-evolutionary 
processes (see also Willke 1989: 90; Rosewitz and Schimank 1988: 298-304). 
Although there are a number of discussions in Luhmann's work which are related 
to problems of an industrial relations system, he has not directly applied his theory and 
analyses of social systems to a discussion of industrial relations as a social system. This 
might have theoretical reasons. But it might also be due to Luhmann's anti-Marxist 
convictions. Luhmann resents that the „exhausted“ Marxist theory of society dominates 
both a number of discourses within sociology and descriptions of our system of society 
(Luhmann 1988: 168). Luhmann's anti-Marxism, however, should not prevent research 
from describing industrial relations as a social system. In fact, Luhmann's self-inflicted 
resistance to industrial relations leaves some space for his students to advance 
autopoietic systems theory and to apply it to one of the rare fields which have not been 
treated by an exhaustive study by Luhmann himself. 
4. Industrial Relations in the World Society 
For Luhmann the modern society is the result of a process of evolution from 
earlier forms of societies. Predecessors of the modern functionally differentiated 
society are segmented and stratified societies. Furthermore he challenges the notion 
of a national society. For him there exists only one modern society, which is the 
world society. In his later writings, and in particular in his opus magnum, the 
Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft, he postulates with quite some rigour that viewing 
society as the all-embracing social system implies that there exists only one society, 
and this is the world society (Luhmann 1997, Vol. I:  145). The world society is 
differentiated spatially into regions and functionally into function systems.  
To view the social system of industrial relations as part of the world society thus 
leads to a reassessment of international developments. Industrial relations that operate 
in the context of the world society are confronted with processes of globalisation. 
However, there are both challenges and opportunities deriving from globalisation. 
Globalisation of trade and manufacturing and in particular internet-related service 
activities have led to new demands for regulation. The introduction of international 
standards includes social regulations that affect industrial relations. There are several 
attempts to add a 'social dimension' to globalisation by establishing a global legal 
framework of labour standards. International labour law derives foremost from labour 
standards introduced by the International Labour Organisation. Links of trade 
measures and labour rights (the so-called social clause), enforced by the World Trade 
Organisation (see Myrdal 1994), and economic and social rights as part of universal 
human rights are currently promoted as new sources of global labour law. The lively 
debate will possibly lead to further legislative efforts to create minimum labour 
standards at the global level. However the major obstacle of weak enforcement of 
these standards is also likely to remain. Furthermore, new forms of co-operation and 
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joint collective decision-making emerge within multi- or trans-national companies, 
sometimes supported by law. A good example in this respect are European works 
councils introduced within the European Union.  
If globalisation is mainly associated with markets and free trade, the adoption of 
labour law and collective bargaining at supranational and international level indicate 
the limits of globalisation. An entirely free world market will not be able to retain 
growth over a longer period. It seems likely that the world market, like all other markets, 
requires 'state intervention' to achieve „growth with stability“ (Boyer/ Drache 1996). 
Insofar as industrial relations and collective bargaining at international level are 
concerned, much will depend on the role of collective organisations. Industrial 
relations are fragile as an autonomous function system because the organisation of 
collective bargaining depends on the future of interest representation. The autopoiesis 
of collective bargaining requires an organisational structure, which protects it not 
only from interventions from other social systems like the political, the economic and 
the legal system but also from fluctuations and changes in the unions and employer 
associations. Since support from an active welfare state and law is lacking, traditional 
trade union internationalism will have to find new partners at the global level. 
Possible candidates are social movements, which promote human rights, in particular 
those of migrants. In utopian versions of a law of humankind, which creates the basis 
of a global community, replacing both the state and the market as regulatory sites, 
labour might find support and a place in transnational coalitions (Sousa Santos 1995: 
365-373).  
However, it is more likely that the globalisation of the labour movement takes 
place at home. Indeed, increased recognition of the local through global exposure 
already supports labour movements in their endeavours. Achievements at the 
workplace and in collective negotiations can rapidly be disseminated in the global 
world. Furthermore the global challenge to workplace industrial relations releases 
new energies to defend and even strengthen existing institutional regimes 
(Bélanger/Edwards/Haiven 1994). It is one of the main strengths of the autopoietic 
perspective to be able to understand that industrial relations of advanced national 
economies, in conjunction with a reflexive type of labour law (see 
Rogowski/Wilthagen 1994), become mediating forces which protect their 
achievements through endorsement of their global role (see Wilthagen 1998). Insofar 
as collective bargaining at sectoral and company level and national labour law 
systems are able to accept the global challenge through reflecting their global 
position, these confident local, regional and national industrial relations will 
constitute important premises of the world society. 
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